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Nuclear Testing Rocks the Sub-Continent:
Can International Law Halt the




The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have created
concern that the historic conflict over Kashmir might suddenly boil
over into a full scale war.1 The Kashmir conflict and the current
effort by India and Pakistan to build nuclear arsenals are deeply
intertwined.
Directly after the 1998 Indian nuclear tests, Indian Home
Minister L.K. Avani admonished the Pakistani government to "roll
back its anti-India policy with regard to Kashmir," and that further
Pakistani support for the Kashmiri militants would be "futile and
costly" for Pakistan.2 "The long-standing and ever-unfolding conflict
between India and Pakistan" over the fate of Kashmir "has
consistently provided dangerous opportunities for violent
engagement., 3 In light of the recent activation of each nations'
nuclear weapons program, an arms race could ensue and, even worse,
a possible nuclear exchange could occur. Movement towards the
resolution of this conflict is essential because it is the principle cause
* J.D. candidate, 2000, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. India and Pakistan both exploded five nuclear devices in May, 1998. See
David Albright, The Shots Heard Around the World, BuLL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS,
July/Aug. 1998, at 24.
2. See Surinder Singh Oberoi, Caught in the Crossfire, BULL. OF ATOM.
SCIENTIST, Sep./Oct. 1998, at 13.
3. Anthony W. St. John, The Mediating Role in the Kashmir Dispute Between
India and Pakistan, 21 SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 173,174 (1997).
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of hostility between India and Pakistan.4 Unfortunately, "the lengthy
diplomatic record concerning Kashmir... has been.., a record of
failure." 5
Pakistan is unlikely to scale down its nuclear efforts unless it has
guarantees that India will do the same.' "India claims that it must
maintain and develop its nuclear capabilities to deter China," its
other nuclear neighbor, from making territorial encroachments in
Northern India.7 India further maintains that the anti-proliferation
regime instituted by the international community is inequitable
because it prohibits non-nuclear nations from attaining nuclear
technology while allowing nuclear nations to retain their nuclear
weapons.8 There is no easy solution to this pressing problem and
something must be done before it's too late.
This note investigates the relationship between the testing and
development of nuclear weapons with international law. Two aspects
of international law that prohibit future testing and development of
nuclear weapons are examined. First, this note determines if a
prohibition against nuclear testing and development has been
elevated into the corpus of customary international law through
previous treaties and actions of the international community. Second,
the implied prohibition against nuclear testing and development
contained in traditional and recently created customary international
environmental law is investigated and evaluated.
H. Historic Conflict in Kashmir
The fate of Kashmir has been in dispute since 1947.' The conflict
in Kashmir mainly involves issues of territorial aggrandizement.
However, religion also plays an enormous role in shaping the
conflict's dynamics.
From 1858 until 1947, The Indian subcontinent was a colony of
England." British India consisted of 9 provinces and 584 princely
4. See id.
5. Id. at 173.
6. See id. at 177.
7. Id.
8. See Farhan Haq, Clinton Leads CTBT Signing but Experts Doubt Results,
INTERNAT'L PRESS SERVICE, September 24,1996, at 1.
9. See Ali Khan, The Kashmir Dispute: A Plan For Regional Cooperation, 31
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 495, 495 (1994).
10. See id. at 504.
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states.1' The provinces were under the total control of the English
Crown. 2 The princely states retained their internal sovereignty,
although their external affairs were governed by England.
3
When the British left, they Partitioned their former empire into
the states of India and Pakistan. 4 The arbitrary creation of separate
countries out of what was historically one country caused great
upheaval. 5 Pakistan viewed this event as its chance to break away
from the mainland. 6  India viewed the same event as an
unsubstantiated division of its territory.' From that moment forward,
India and Pakistan had irreconcilable political objectives.
The British plan for withdrawal did not determine the political or
geographic dispositions of the semi-independent princely states.8
The princely states were granted total independence by England and
allowed to determine their own future.'9 India and Pakistan adopted
different positions on the independence of the princely states.' India
thought that the princely states were falsely granted independence
and desired to annex them.2' Pakistan thought that the states were
correctly given independence, but also wanted to annex them.' Most
princely states could not survive on their own and eventually chose to
become part of India or Pakistan. 3 Only three important states
managed to retain their autonomy. 4 Kashmir was one of these
states.2
Three major religions were represented in Kashmir.'6 There
were Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims.'7 The Muslims were the
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 505.
14. See SISIR GuPTA, KASHMIR: A STUDY IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS, 13-14
(1966).





20. See id. at 505-06.
21. See id. at 496, 506.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 507.
24. See id
25. See id.
26. See id at 496.
27. See id.
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majority.? The population of Pakistan was predominantly Muslim.
Based on Kashmir's dominant Muslim population, Pakistan asserted
a religious claim to Kashmir's territory.
In August 1947, an invasion by Pakistani forces and an uprising
among Kashmiri Muslims compelled Kashmir's ruler to seek the
assistance of India. ° India agreed to fend off the hostile forces only if
Kashmir surrendered its autonomy and became part of India.31
Kashmir agreed to India's terms with the condition that it could keep
its own constitution.32 India then sent troops to engage the
Pakistanis.33 The Indian troops were successful and the Pakistanis
were driven back to the western third of Kashmir 4
Subsequently, India and Pakistan fought three intense, but brief
wars over control of Kashmir." The last war was fought in 1971 and
an armistice followed.3 Nothing was resolved. The current situation
in Kashmir continues to pose a serious threat to peace and security in
the region. Indian and Pakistani troops exchange artillery fire in
Kashmir on a daily basis, even despite the 1971 armistice agreement.'
The ongoing development of nuclear weapons and acquisition of
ballistic missile technology add urgency to the resolution of the
Kashmir conflict.'
III. Nuclear Conflict: India & Pakistan
A. India's Nuclear Program
India first tested a nuclear device in 1974."9 It was a fission device
and it measured 12 kilotons.' The device relied on plutonium as its
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See Gupta, supra note 14, at 111-14, 122-23.
31. See id. at 122.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 126.
34. See Khan, supra note 9, at 508-09.




39. See Ayesha Khan, Pakistan Joins the Club, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS,
July/Aug. 1998, at 34.
40. See David Albright, Shots Heard Round the World, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS,
July/Aug. 1998, at 22.
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source of fuel and it was detonated underground.41 The Indian
government described the test as a peaceful explosion.4 2 Some
nations were outraged by India's actions and either completely
stopped the transfer of nuclear technologies to India or continued
transferring technology only with special assurances. 4 Since 1974, the
Indian nuclear weapons program appeared to be dormant.
In May 1998, India surprised the international community by
conducting five more underground nuclear tests." These tests were
held at the Pokhran test range, a desert site located 350 miles
southwest of New Delhi.45 The devices tested at Pokhran were a
thermonuclear device with a yield of 43 kilotons and four fission
devices with yields ranging between 12 and 0.2 kilotons. These
devices used plutonium as their source of fuel.47
Immediately after these tests, the Indian government announced
to the world that the testing had achieved two goals.4 8 First, the tests
showed that India was capable of creating a wide-range of nuclear
weapons.49 Second, the tests allowed India to update their 1974
weapon design.5 The Indian government also announced to the
world that it would place a moratorium on any further nuclear
testing.5
Currently, India has many aircraft capable of carrying nuclear
devices.52 India has a reliable intermediate-range ballistic missile and
is developing a long-range ballistic missile.53 India is also developing
41. See David Albright & Mark Hibbs, India's Silent Bomb, BuLL. ATOM.
SCIENTISTS, September 1992, at 2.
42. See Khan, supra note 39, at 35.
43. See Gary Milhollin, Stopping the Indian Bomb, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 593, 596
(1987) (Canada completely suspended all nuclear cooperation with India as a result
of the 1974 India nuclear test. The United States continued nuclear cooperation with
India on the condition that India would only pursue "peaceful" uses of nuclear
technology).




48. See id. at 22.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 21.
52. See Robert S. Norris & William Arkin, After Tests: India and Pakistan
Update, BuLL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Sep./Oct. 1998, at 70.
53. See Andrew Kotch & Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Subcontinental Missiles,
BULL. ATOM. ScIENTIsTs, July/Aug. 1998, at 45-46,48.
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submarines and sea-to-surface missile technologies.'
India's capacity to produce weapon-grade plutonium has been
developed for over thirty-five years.5 Taking into account the fuel
output of Indian reactors, some experts have estimated that India had
370 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium in 1997.56 At five
kilograms of plutonium per warhead, India could already posses up to
seventy-four nuclear weapons."
B. Pakistan's Nuclear Program
Despite admonishments from the international community,
Pakistan responded to India's nuclear tests with nuclear tests of its
own. Eleven days after India's tests, Pakistan detonated five nuclear
devices. 8 They were all underground explosions and were carried out
in the southwestern region of Pakistan. 9 The yield of the largest
explosion was 30-35 kilotons and the other tests were a variety of
small, low-yield explosions.' The Pakistani government stated that
all the devices were either fission devices or boosted fission devices. 1
It further indicated that Pakistan could construct a thermonuclear
device given the time and resources.'
The Pakistani government stated that there were two objectives
to its nuclear tests.6' First, the tests were meant to deter India from
using military force against Pakistan." Second, the tests generated
scientific data that will make Pakistani nuclear weapons more
effective in the future.6'
Before the tests, Pakistan probably could only have produced a
large, antiquated nuclear device and delivered it by attack aircraft.
Now, Pakistan will be able to design a smaller nuclear device and
deliver it on a missile.' This innovation coincides with Pakistan's
54. See Norris & Arkin, supra note 52, at 71.
55. See Albright, supra note 40, at 24.
56. See id. at 34.
57. See id.
58. See David Albright, Pakistan: The Other Shoe Drops, BULL. ATOM.
SCIENTISTS, July/Aug. 1998, at 24.
59. See id.




64. See id. at 24.
65. See id. at 25.
66. See id.
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recent unveiling of a reliable intermediate-range ballistic missile.67
Considerable uncertainty surrounds how much weapon-grade
uranium Pakistan possesses. Pakistan broke a 1991 nuclear fuel
moratorium and restarted full-scale production of weapon-grade
uranium shortly before its recent bout of testing.68 Experts have
estimated that Pakistan is in possession of 335-400 kilograms of
weapon-grade uranium.6" If Pakistan uses 20 kilograms of weapon-
grade uranium per warhead, it could possess between 16-20 nuclear
weapons.7"
C. Global Results of Continued Nuclear Testing
In light of Indian nuclear superiority, Pakistan may perceive an
imbalance of power. Coupled with the seriousness of the Kashmir
conflict, Pakistan may attempt to develop its nuclear program.
Future nuclear testing will likely occur. India may increase its nuclear
arsenal in an attempt to maintain its nuclear advantage over Pakistan
and an arms race could result. An arms race will produce grave
environmental harm and political instability in the region and
throughout the world.
1. Environmental Effects of Nuclear Testing
It is well established that residual nuclear radiation is an
inescapable side effect of nuclear tests." This radiation is very
difficult to contain, even despite the most stringent of precautionary
measures.7 At least 1,950 nuclear tests have been carried out since
1 945*3 Testing can be carried out in space, in the air, on the earth's
surface, under water or underground. To date, it is reported that
approximately 1,420 underground tests have been conducted in
different parts of the world.74
67. See Kotch & Sidhu, supra note 53, at 44.
68. See Albright, supra note 58, at 25.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. For a discussion on the effects of nuclear explosions, see Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 814, 886-95 (1996) (dissenting opinion
of Judge Weeramantry); id. at 863-64 (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen);
id. at 928-30 (dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons
Opinion].
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After the initial detonation, underground tests entail the risk of
instantaneous leaks of short-lived and long-lived radioactive isotopes
to the ground, water and air.75 Underground tests also may cause
long-term environmental harm if the test site is disturbed at a later
date. 6 For example, changes to the structural integrity of the ground,
changes in temperature and stress are likely to increase the number
and size of crevices in the rock or ground surrounding an
underground test site.' These crevices provide paths for meaningful
exchanges of radioactive isotopes with the environment via ground
water, rivers, oceans and the atmosphere." Given the dynamic nature
of the Earth's crust, radiation generated in underground tests must
eventually escape into the ecosystem.
The most common long-term radioactive isotopes produced by
testing are Caesium-137, Strontium-90, Plutonium-239 and
Americium-241." Caesium-137 and Strontium-90 are known to be
transported by water and to enter the food-chain. ° Plutonium-239
and Americium-241 escape into the atmosphere and can be inhaled."'
All of these isotopes are highly radioactive and have been proven to
cause cancer and genetic mutation.' In addition, isotopes from
previous tests which had already settled or lodged in the rock can be
released into the environment by subsequent nuclear testing.'
There is no such thing as safe nuclear weapon testing. There is
always a danger that future generations will be placed at risk through
radiation from today's tests.
2. Political Effects of Nuclear Testing
Nuclear testing creates political instability because it requires a
substantial economic investment. One, small fission device typically
costs five million U.S. dollars to manufacture.' Pakistan's economy is











85. See Khan, supra note 39, at 37.
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billion, out of which 45 percent was spent on debt service and 24
percent on defense.8 If Pakistan begins increasing its defense budget
there will be nothing left for its peoplef The spending effects of
continued nuclear tests might bankrupt the Pakistani economy. One
day, the Pakistani government might be forced to sell nuclear fuel,
nuclear weapons or nuclear technology to generate capital.
Uncontrollable .nuclear proliferation could ensue and the world
political regime might become destabilized.
There are strong political forces contending for control of
Pakistan.' Pakistan has been ruled on and off by the military for half
of its history.' In October of 1999, Pakistan's democratically elected
government was overthrown and traded for a military regime." If
Pakistan's political climate does not eventually stabilize, Pakistan
may become divided and compartmentalized, like a warlord-ridden,
nuclear Somalia. Each faction would control nuclear weapons and a
nuclear civil war could ensue. The world could be at the mercy of a
rogue nuclear state. The effect on the world could be incredibly
destabilizing.
3. Conclusion
Due to the detrimental environmental and potentially
destabilizing effects of an arms race between India and Pakistan,
further nuclear development must be prohibited. A nuclear arms
race must be averted and nuclear testing must grind to a halt. There
are legal strategies in international law that can be harnessed to
achieve this goal.
IV. Current Status of International Law
It is undisputed that nuclear tests have the ability to cause vast
environmental disruption and protracted illnesses.9 Further, nuclear
86. See id.
87. See id. ("One billion people live in India and Pakistan and 740 million of
them lack elementary sewage facilities. Nevertheless, between 1990 and 1996, the
two countries spent the equivalent of $70 million dollars on defense.").
88. Kotch & Sidhu, supra note 53, at 44.
89. Andrea Koppel, U.S. Caught by Surprise by Pakistan. Coup (October 12,
1999) <http://www.CNN.com>.
90. See id.
91. See Martin Feinrider, International Law as Law of the Land: Another
Constitutional Constraint on Use of Nuclear Weapons, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
THE LAW 83, 97 (Arthur Selwyn Miller & Martin Feinrider eds., 1984).
2000]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
weapons can destabilize the world political regime. The international
community has done much to slow the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and minimize the harm of nuclear testing.' There are two
important legal strategies that have been harnessed to bar non-
nuclear nations from developing nuclear technology. First, the
international community drafted and signed treaties intended to halt
nuclear testing and development. 9' Second, the international
community recognized international customs that place restrictions
on nuclear weapon testing.
A. Treaty
Treaties are considered one of the main sources of international
law and, consequently, have significant precedential value.94 One of
the most basic principles of international law is pacta sunt servanda, a
nation must keep its promises.9 Treaties are formal records of these
promises. A nation is bound by a treaty only if it agrees to abide by
the treaty's provisions." Also, a nation may avoid being bound by all
provisions in a treaty by making reservations to specific treaty
provisions before signing.' Reserved treaty provisions can not be
enforced against the nation that reserved them.'
Treaty obligations are enforced under the authority of a U.N.
resolution or by a decision from the International Court of Justice
(ICJ). Trade embargoes and military interventions are the most
efficient methods of obtaining compliance with treaty obligations.
92. See generally Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, September 24, 1996, 1996 WL
924706, 122 [hereinafter CTBT]; Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty,
December 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 639 [hereinafter SAZT]; African Nuclear Weapon
Free-Zone Treaty, June 21, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 704 [hereinafter AZT]; South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, August 6,1985,24 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter SPZT]; Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 7
I.L.M. 809 (1968) [hereinafter NPT]; Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under water, August 5, 1963, T.I.A.S. No. 5433,
480 U.N.T.S. 43 (1963) [hereinafter LTBT].
93. See CTBT, supra note 92; SAZT, supra note 92; AZT, supra note 92, at 704;
SPZT, supra note 92.
94. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, ch. II, art. 38,
59 stat. 1031, U.S.T.S. 993. This provision lists four categories from which the ICJ
can draw when determining what is international law.
95. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679
(sec. I, art. 26 defines pacta sunt servanda) [hereinafter Vienna].
96. See Vienna, supra note 95, art. 18.
97. See id., art. 21.
98. See id.
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There are two categories of treaties that govern the role of
nuclear weapons. First, there are treaties prohibiting the testing and
development of nuclear weapons. Second, there are treaties
establishing or recognizing international environmental obligations
that prohibit the testing and development of nuclear weapons.
1. Treaties That Prohibit Testing and Development
There are treaties that limit the acquisition, manufacture and
possession of nuclear weapons.' Some treaties prohibit nations from
deploying nuclear weapons in specific areas" and other treaties
forbid nations from testing nuclear weapons in certain locations."
India and Pakistan are parties to only one of these treaties. India and
Pakistan are both parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons
Tests in the Atmosphere in Outer Space and Under Water (LTBT)1
2
Article I, section 2 of the LTBT prohibits nations from "causing,
encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out [of] any
nuclear weapon test explosion" in the atmosphere, in outer space or
underwater."° On its face, the LTBT does not specifically prohibit
underground nuclear tests. However, Article I, section (1)(b) of the
LTBT prohibits tests that occur in "any... environment if such
explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the
territorial limits of the state."' The treaty further states that none of
its provisions will bar any future prohibition on forms of nuclear
testing, even underground nuclear explosions. 5
In 1963, when the LTBT was signed and concluded, scientific
research had determined that underground nuclear tests were
environmentally safe. Today, science thinks that underground
99. See generally CIBT, supra note 92, at 924706; SAZT, supra note 92, at 639;
AZT, supra note 92, at 702; SPZT, supra note 92, at 1440; NPT, supra note 92, at 809;
LTBT, supra note 92, at 43.
100. See generally SAZT, supra note 92, at 639; AZT, supra note 92, at 702; SPZT,
supra note 92, at 1440; Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor
and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, 10 I.L.M. 145 [hereinafter
OFT].
101. See generally SAZT, supra note 92, at 639; AZT, supra note 92, at 702; SPZT,
supra note 92, at 1440; LTBT, supra note 92, at 43; Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12
U.S.T. 794,402 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter Antarctica].
102. LTBT, supra note 92, art. I.
103. LTBT, supra note 92, art. I, sec. 2.
104. LTBT, supra note 92, art. I, sec. 1(b).
105. See id.
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nuclear tests have a significant probability of releasing radioactive
isotopes into the environment.' 06 Over the course of years, the effects
of these radioactive isotopes cannot be kept confined within the
territorial boundaries of any one nation." Therefore, if the LTBT
were to take these new scientific discoveries into account, it would
also prohibit underground nuclear explosions. However, the LTBT
specifically omits underground nuclear explosions from its list of
geographic prohibitions."' For this reason, the international
community may be unlikely to extend the prohibitions of the LTBT
to underground nuclear tests.
Despite the great number of other treaties limiting nuclear
weapons development, India and Pakistan have signed none of them.
India has protested against the major nuclear weapons treaties."°
There is no controlling international agreement, other than the
LTBT, that can be construed to specifically prohibit India and
Pakistan from conducting underground nuclear tests."
2. Treaties Establishing International Environmental Obligations
There are many treaties whose provisions limit the legality of
detonating nuclear weapons through international environmental
law.' However, India and Pakistan are only parties to two of them.
2
106. See WHO Report, supra note 72.
107. See id. at 12. (This report details new scientific discoveries regarding
underground nuclear testing that may trigger nuclear testing prohibitions contained
in the LTBT. Most specifically, that radioisotopes are necessarily released into the
environment by underground nuclear tests and their effects cannot be contained
within a nation's territorial boundaries. If this is truly the case, art. I, sec. 2 of the
LTBT would completely bar even underground nuclear testing).
108. LTBT, supra note 92, art. I.
109. Albright & Hibbs, supra note 41, at 2; Haq, supra note 8, at 1.
110. See LTBT, supra note 92, at 43 (as evidenced by the treaty's title, which aims
to "ban nuclear weapons test[ing] in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.").
111. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, U.N.
Doc. AICONF.151/26 (vol. I) (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter
Rio]; Resolution on the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War,
December 12, 1980, G.A. Res. 35/152D, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 69,
U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981); Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment, June 16 1972, U.N. Doc. AICONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973),
reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm]; Resolution on the Non-
Use of Force in International Relations and Permanent Prohibition of the Use of
Nuclear Weapons, November, 29, 1972, G.A. Res. 2936, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess.,
Supp. No. 30, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1970) [hereinafter IRP]; Prohibition of the Use
of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons, November 24, 1961, G.A. Res. 1653, U.N.
GAOR. 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1962) [hereinafter PUNT].
112. Protocol Additional (No. I) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,
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The first is the 1977 Protocol I of the Geneva Convention
(Protocol I)."' Article 35(3) prohibits the employment of "methods
or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause
widespread, long-term damage to the natural environment."'' 4
Article 55(1) similarly prohibits "widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the environment." '
The second treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques (ENMOD).'16 Article 1(1) of ENMOD prohibits the use
of weapons having "widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects on the
environment.
11 7
India has signed and ratified ENMOD, but is not a party to
Protocol 1.118 Pakistan has signed and ratified both of these treaties. 9
The provisions of ENMOD and Protocol I define clear environmental
obligations for nations waging or preparing to wage war. However,
the provisions of ENMOD have two shortcomings in regards to
nuclear testing.
First, "Environment" is not defined in either document and this
renders their provisions vague."" There has been no litigation to
define this term and no move by the international community to
clarify its meaning. The treaty's scope remains uncertain. This
oversight may pose a difficult obstacle in the enforcement of the
treaties.
Second, more importantly, the context of the prohibitions in both
treaties refer to the use of weapons in warfare. The Protocol I was
proposed for the specific purpose of codifying the laws of war."
ENMOD was instituted for the sole purpose of prohibiting nations
from permanently altering the environment as a strategy of war.
1"
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, Dec.
10,1976, T.I.A.S. 9164, 16 I.L.M. 88 [hereinafter ENMOD].
113. See generally Protocol I, supra note 112.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Cf generally ENMOD, supra note 112.
117. Id.
118. See generally Protocol I, supra note 112; ENMOD, supra note 112.
119. Cf. generally ENMOD, supra note 112; Protocol I, supra note 112.
120. See generally Protocol I, supra note 112; ENMOD, supra note 112.
121. See generally Protocol I, supra note 112.
122. See generally ENMOD, supra note 112.
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Environmental conduct in times of peace has not been addressed in
either of these documents. Neither of these treaties provide
controlling authority for the peacetime development or testing of
nuclear weapons.
India and Pakistan engaged in nuclear testing only during times
of peace with one another.'2' Despite the unrest in Kashmir, India
and Pakistan have signed an armistice and, even though the fighting
continues, it is considered valid under international law.24 Neither
nation is considered to be engaged in war. Further, the nuclear tests
were not directly used in warfare and were even deemed as
"peaceful" by the Indian and Pakistani governments. The
aforementioned treaties specifically apply to use of weapons on a
battlefield, in times of warfare."2' For that reason, these treaties are
not controlling in this situation.
B. Custom
Customary international law refers to the body of uncodified law
creating legal obligations between nations. No single organization
exists to create, interpret or enforce customary international law. 6
Customary international law is created and governed in four ways: (1)
by international conventions, (2) behavior of nations, (3) general
principles of law recognized by nations, (4) and judicial
decisions/scholarly writings.lV Customary international law is relied
on when there is no written construction of law.
1. How Custom is Created
Traditional behavior between nations may develop into
customary international law. Behavior between nations must be
extensive and virtually uniform to become part of custom, but it does
not have to be unanimous." There are traditionally four elements
that are examined when determining if a traditional behavior is
custom: (1) there must be a concordant behavior by a number of
nations, (2) there must be a repetition of this behavior over a
123. See Khan, supra note 9, at 491.
124. See id.
125. See generally Protocol I, supra note 112; ENMOD, supra note 112.
126. B. WESTON, R. FALK, & A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
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considerable period of time, (3) the behavior must be viewed as being
legally binding and (4) there must be a general acquiescence in the
behavior by other nations.'2 9 The last two elements are often referred
to as "opinio juris."'
A provision of a convention or a treaty may attain universal
acceptance as customary law even if only a few nations were a part of
it."' When a provision of custom is incorporated into a convention or
a treaty, it cannot be invalidated if a party objects or withdraws from
the convention or treaty." However, if a nation expressly objects to a
behavior before it is recognized as becoming custom, the nation will
not be bound by this custom. 3 This is called the "persistent objector"
exception.'
Although India and Pakistan are not parties to the majority of
treaties that prohibit nuclear testing or development 35 and cannot be
legally bound to them, the Vienna Convention states that nothing
precludes a treaty from eventually becoming custom.1 6  The
prohibition against nuclear testing and development included in many
prior treaties could now be considered custom. If so, the nuclear tests
carried out by India and Pakistan controverted international
customary law."
There are two ways that a prohibition against nuclear testing and
development might exist in international custom. First, the
magnitude and unanimity of nations ratifying treaties that prohibit
nuclear testing and development might have elevated the prohibition
to custom.' Second, general principles of customary international
environmental law may prohibit nuclear testing and development.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See Vienna, supra note 95, art. 38 (arguing that nothing in articles 34 and 37
stop a rule in a treaty from evolving into customary international law).
132. See Jill M. Sheldon, Nuclear Weapons and the Laws of War: Does Customary
International Law Prohibiting the Use of Nuclear Weapons in All Circumstances?, 20
FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 181,201 (1996).
133. See Adam Steinfeld, Nuclear Objections: The Persistent Objector and The
Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 62 BROOK. L. Rnv. 1635,1642-43 (1996).
134. Id. at 1642.
135. See generally CTBT, supra note 92; SAZT, supra note 92; AZT, supra note
92; SPZT, supra note 92; NPT, supra note 92.
136. Vienna, supra note 95, art. 38.
137. Sheldon, supra note 132, at 244-46.
138. See id.
139. Timothy J. Heverin, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons:
Environmental and Humanitarian Limits on Self-Defense, 72 NOTRE DAME L. Rnv.
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2. Treaty Prohibitions on Nuclear Testing and Development as
Custom
The cumulative effect of treaties addressing nuclear issues might
establish a customary rule prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.
There are treaties that restrict and prohibit nuclear tests, call for
eventual nuclear disarmament and provide for the non-proliferation
of nuclear technology.44 Together these treaties arguably represent
the international community's dedication to complete nuclear
disarmament. These treaties can be taken as evidence of the
international community's attempt to eliminate nuclear weapons.
There are four main treaties that illustrate the scope of the
141international community's efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.
a. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water
The LTBT was concluded in 1963.42 More than 120 states were
party to the agreement.143 Article I, section 2 prohibits nations from
"causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in [a] nuclear
weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion" in the
atmosphere, in outer space or underwater. 144 Article I, section (1)(b)
explains the policy behind this limitation by stating that the LTBT
will not "prejudice... the conclusion of a [future] treaty resulting in
the banning of all nuclear test explosions, including underground
explosions." '145
The large number of nations that ratified the LTBT indicates
that the international community desired to prohibit certain nuclear
testing methods and prevent their environmental effects. Through
Article I, section (1)(b), the international community signaled its
desire to eventually achieve a complete prohibition on all forms of
nuclear testing.
1277,1296 (1997).
140. See generally CTBT, supra note 92; SAZT, supra note 92; AZT, supra note
92; SPZT, supra note 92; NPT, supra note 92; LTBT, supra note 92.
141. See id.
142. See generally LTBT, supra note 92.
143. See id.
144. LTBT, supra note 92, art. 1, § 2.
145. LTBT, supra note 92, art. 1, § 1(b).
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b. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
represents the first important step in eliminating the spread of nuclear
technology. The NPT was signed by 95 countries in 1968 and first
entered into force in 1970." The NPT utilizes the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard the transfer of nuclear
materials and promote the peaceful use of nuclear research.47 The
NPT requires non-nuclear nations to comply with IAEA safeguards
to receive the benefits of nuclear research for peaceful purposes. The
NPT also requires the nuclear nations to pursue negotiations for
complete nuclear disarmament in good faith."4
In 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely by the Review
Conference of States Parties4 9 and signed by 170 nations. 50 The
principles and objectives identified by the conference include
universal adherence to the NPT, establishment of further nuclear-free
zones, strengthening nuclear safeguards and taking more steps toward
nuclear disarmament. 5'
Non-proliferation of nuclear capabilities to non-nuclear states is
an important priority for many nations." This concern is no better
evident than through the creation and reinstatement of the NPT. 53
The support behind the NPT shows that nuclear proliferation is a
growing matter of global concern and that the international
community concertedly desires to prohibit it."
c. Nuclear-Free Zone Treaties
The Nuclear-Free Zone Treaties (NFZT) are designed to
establish prohibitions on the testing or stationing of nuclear weapons
146. See Gary J. Meise, "Securing the Strength of the Renewed NPT China, the
Linchpin A Middle Kingdom", 30 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 539,541 (1997).
147. See William R. Youngblood, Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the
1990s: Power, Politics, and Policies, 9 EMORY INT'L L. Rnv. 329, 331 (1995).
148. NPT, supra note 92, art. I.
149. See Meise, supra note 146, at 541.
150. See Bonnie Jenkins, Arms Control and Development, 31 INT'L LAW 561, 565
(1997).
151. See id.
152. See NPT, supra note 92, art. I (this is evidenced by the fact that 100 nations
participated in the original agreement).
153. See id. (The NPT was reenacted by 75 more nations than had initially enacted
it).
154. See Haq, supra note 8, at 1.
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inside certain regions.' NFZTs have been used to establish systems
of nuclear safeguards that reach an even greater number of activities
than the NPT.'56 Since 1964, over 15 of the NFZTs have entered into
force."' NFZTs build on the NPT and serve to tighten the ever
closing nuclear testing window.58
The promulgation of the NFZTs have covered a significant area
of the world and incorporate nations that were not a part of previous
nuclear development treaties. The NFZTs build on the provisions of
the NPT and signal the international community's growing desire to
foreclose the ability of nations to develop nuclear weapons.
d. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened for
signature on September 20, 1996."9 It is the most far-reaching
attempt to impede the testing and development of nuclear weapons.
Article I of the CTBT, building on provisions taken directly from the
NPT and LTBT, asks:
[E]ach State Party... (1) not to carry out any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion; (2) to prohibit and
prevent any nuclear explosions at any place under its jurisdiction
and control; and (3) to refrain from causing, encouraging or, in any
way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
60
The CTBT establishes a global monitoring organization to
achieve the object and the purpose of the treaty.16' The CTBT also
establishes a new, more stringent verification regime than the NPT 62
155. See Mark E. Rosen, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones: Time for a Fresh Look, 8
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 29,30 (1997).
156. See id. at 34.
157. See generally SAZT, supra note 92, at 639; AZT, supra note 92, at 702; SPZT,
supra note 92, at 1440; OFT, supra note 100, art. I; Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 521; Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,1967, art. IV, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
480 U.N.T.S. 45; Antarctica, supra note 101, art. V & VI.
158. NPT, supra note 92, art. VII ("Nothing in this treaty effects the rights of any
group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of
nuclear weapons in their respective territories.").
159. CTBT, supra note 92, art I.
160. CTBT, supra note 92, art. I; NPT, supra note 92, art. I; LTBT, supra note 92,
art. I.
161. CTBT, supra note 92, art. IV.
162. See Youngblood, supra note 147, at 554.
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It consists of an international monitoring system and provides for on-
site, nuclear facility inspections.'6' The CTBT allows violations to be
redressed before the ICJ.' Lastly, the CTBT reiterates the NPT
regime's goal of total disarmament."
The CTBT represents the culmination of the process of
prohibiting nuclear weapons development because it attempts to stop
all nuclear testing. The CTBT is uncanny among treaties because it
does not allow nations to make reservations to any of its provisions.1
66
If a nation signs it, the nation must comply with it in whole. A nation
is necessarily bound to every sentence of the treaty. This shows the
international community's serious commitment to prohibit all nuclear
testing, once and for all.
After signature, a nation can only opt out of the CTBT's
provisions if it enacts the "supreme interest" clause. 67 This clause can
only be invoked if the very existence of a nation is threatened and the
nation can only use its nuclear weapons in self-defense.' 16 Six months
notice must be given for the request to take effect under the treaty. 69
The notice requirement is not very practical if a nation is faced with a
rapid need to engage in self-defense. The concept of self-defense is
sacred in international law. It is found in nearly every international
treaty on the law of war.'70 Placing a limitation on the application of
self-defense shows that the international community strongly desires
to deter a nation from developing nuclear weapons.Y
Finally, the provision prohibiting one nation from "encouraging"
others to develop nuclear weapons is extended to effects occurring in
other states."r For example, this provision prohibits country X from
testing a nuclear device if country Z will test a nuclear device in
response. This provision makes starting an arms race contrary to
international law. It shows that the international community is not
only affirming prior steps to curtail nuclear weapons development,
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. CTBT, supra note 92, preamble.
166. See id. at art. XV.
167. Id. at art. IX, para. 2.
168. See id.
169. See id. at art. IX, para. 3.
170. See U.N. Charter art. 51; IRP. supra note 111, at 5; PUNT, supra note 111, at
4.
171. See U.N. Charter art. 52; IRP, supra note 111, at 5; PUNT, supra note 111, at
4.
172. CTBT, supra note 92, art. I, para. 2.
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but it is also instituting efforts to limit their undesirable economic and
political effects.
e. The Elements of Custom Applied
Behavior
Behavior is the first issue to examine in determining whether
these treaties have been elevated to custom.'" Behavior must be
concordant and repetitive over a long period of time. 4
There is no doubt that the international community engaged in a
concordant behavior. Many nations voted with one another to limit
the proliferation of nuclear technology and eventually ban all types of
nuclear testing." Further, every treaty expressed the eventual goal of
complete nuclear disarmament."6 The smallest ratifying vote for a
nuclear development treaty was 95 nations.'" Even this amount
represents a significant share of the entire international community.
The behavior was repetitive because of the number of treaties
involved. There has been a long history of international opposition to
the testing, maintenance, proliferation and use of nuclear weapons.18
This is evidenced by many UN General Assembly resolutions and
international agreements between 1974 and 1995 that were aimed at
reducing the threat from nuclear weapons and eliminating nuclear
testing.7 9 The NPT conference reiterated the importance of the link
between a moratorium on further nuclear testing and non-
proliferation by mandating that nations exercise the "utmost
restraint" on nuclear testing until the CTBT was completed.Il Other
173. World Order, supra note 126, at 80.
174. See id.
175. See Rio, supra note 111, at 874; Resolution on the Non-Use of Nuclear
Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War, supra note 111, at 69; Stockholm, supra
note 111, at 1416; IRP, supra note 111, at 5; PUNT, supra note 111, at 4.
176. See generally CTBT, supra note 92; SAZT, supra note 92; AZT, supra note
92; SPZT, supra note 92; NPT, supra note 92; LTBT, supra note 92.
177. See NPT, supra note 92, at 809.
178. See Prudence Taylor, Testing Times for the World Court: Judicial Process and
the 1995 French Nuclear Test Case, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 199, 207
(1997).
179. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2163, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 11-12, U.N.
Doc. A/6530 (1966); G.A. Res. 1648, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 3,
U.N. Doc. A/4942/Add.1 (1961); G.A. Res. 1402A, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at 4 U.N. Doc. A/4290 (1959); G.A. Res. 1252, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp.
No. 18, at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).
180. See Report of the Drafting Committee, 1995 Review and Extension Conference
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indicators of repetitive international behavior are requests by the UN
General Assembly and the World Health Organization (WHO) to the
ICJ for advisory opinions on the use of nuclear weapons."'
The effort to prohibit nuclear development and testing through
treaties has continued over the better part of 45 years."' Although 45
years is not very long in terms of world history, nuclear weapons were
only invented 55 years ago. In comparison, negotiations to halt
nuclear testing began at nearly the same time nuclear weapons were
invented. These negotiations should be viewed in light of the date
nuclear testing began. Also, 45 years is a long time for the
international community to remain united in the pursuit of a single
goal. There are few other international concerns that have garnered
so much attention and held it for so long. For these reasons, nuclear
development treaties satisfy the behavioral component of custom.
Opinio Juris
The second element of custom is opinio juris.l Nuclear
development treaties need to be viewed as legally binding agreements
and generally followed by the international community to meet this
element.)84
Many nuclear treaty's resoundingly indicate a desire to
eventually prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons entirely. During
the years after the LTBT was signed, the five nuclear nations
continued to test nuclear weapons. Yet, none of the five nuclear
nations tested nuclear weapons above ground. This behavior shows
that the nuclear weapons nations thought that the LTBT was binding.
Many nuclear weapon treaties expressly attempted to halt
nuclear development. During the years after the NPT was signed,
China proliferated nuclear technology to many non-nuclear nations,
most notably to Pakistan." Many non-nuclear nations acquired
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Annex, at 7,
U.N. Doc. NPTICONF.1995/DC1 (1995) (adopting Extension of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons); 1995 Review and Extension Conference of
the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc.
NPTICONF.1995L.6 (1995).
181. See Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 71, at 809; Nuclear Test Case (New
Zealand v. France), 1995 I.C.J. 288 [hereinafter Nuclear Test Case].
182. See Sheldon, supra note 132, at 227 (Negotiations to limit nuclear weapon
production began shortly after the end of WWII).
183. See World Order, supra note 126, at 80.
184. See id.
185. See Albright, supra note 58, at 25.
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nuclear technology during this period and often with the help of
nuclear nations.' This shows that China, among others, did not
particularly consider the NPT to be legaly binding." Even so,
proliferation is not an activity that is inconsistent with the testing
limitations placed on the international community by the LTBT.
Aiding proliferation efforts in contravention to an international treaty
shows that a nation did not believe prohibitions against development
to be binding.
Before and after the CTBT was negotiated and signed, nuclear
nations engaged in arms races and even threatened to use nuclear
weapons against each other. These actions are not consistent with the
provisions of the CTBT and do not show a belief that prohibitions on
nuclear development were binding.
For these reasons, the international community did not act with
opinio juris in regard to nuclear development. In contrast, the
international community engaged in actions that would support the
theory that opinio juris existed in relation to a ban on nuclear testing.
The international prohibition against nuclear testing obtained the
force of law.
Persistent Objector
Even if the current prohibitions against nuclear testing are
considered custom, the rule of the persistent objector may nullify
their applicability to India and Pakistan.1" There are two elements to
the rule of the persistent objector."8 The first is that a nation must
make an objection to an emerging custom. An objection is necessary
to put a nation's neighbors on notice of its views."9 The second is that
the objection must be persistent, consistent and made before the
custom is formed.' The objection must be made through an action
exercising a legal right or through a statement declaring the existence
of a legal right."9
India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests qualify as actions
exercising legal rights. Many nations argue that the mere existence of
treaties prohibiting nuclear testing proves that testing is a legal
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See Steinfeld, supra note 133, at 1642.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 1643.
192. See id.
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right." If nuclear testing was not a legal right, there would be no
need to have treaties prohibiting it.194 Exploding a nuclear device is
simply an exercise of this legal right.
If nuclear testing is not naturally a legal right, India and Pakistan
have declared the existence of their right to test nuclear weapons.
The CTBT will not enter into force until all 44 states listed in the
Conference on Disarmament ratify it. 95 India and Pakistan are
included in the 44 nations needed for ratification and they will not
sign on to the treaty.19 India has protested openly against the
CTBT 1 India has issued statements saying that they will never sign
the CTBT and that it will never enter into force.19 Pakistan opposes
the CTBT because India will not sign on to the treaty."9 Pakistan has
also publicly decried the CTBT as being unfair and stated that it will
never sign it.' Both nations have vociferously opposed the CTBT
both in the UN General Assembly and in the world's press.
India and Pakistan may have exercised a legal right but, their
objection was not persistent and consistent. The requirements of
persistence and consistency are not met through India and Pakistan's
long-standing nuclear development programs. India tested its first
nuclear device in 1974 and then announced a moratorium on further
testing?°' Pakistan prepared its nuclear test site and started
manufacturing weapon grade nuclear fuel sometime in the 1970s.'
These actions were permitted under existing international law. They
were not objections to nuclear testing treaties. India and Pakistan's
nuclear tests in 1998 were not persistent and consistent. These tests
only occurred once. Then India even declared a moratorium on
further testing.
India's and Pakistan's objections did not come before the custom
against all nuclear testing was created. India and Pakistan's tests
were conducted during the existence of previous treaties banning
193. See id. at 1655.
194. See id.
195. See CIBT, supra note 92, at annex 2.
196. See Haq, supra note 8, at 1.
197. See id.
198. See id. ("India will never sign this unequal treaty, not now, not later, this
treaty will never enter into force" said Ambassador Arundhati Ghose).
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See Albright, supra note 58, at 22.
202. Id at 24.
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nuclear development and after the signature date of the CTBT.'
The CTBT represents the culmination of anti-nuclear development
sentiment and is the only treaty that directly prohibits underground
nuclear tests.2 If the custom against nuclear testing is viewed as
being formed at the ratification of any treaty, it should be grounded
here.
f. Conclusion
Although the international community has long attempted to put
an end to nuclear development, its behavior has been contradictory.
Many nations have stated that they support a total ban on nuclear
development, yet continued to conduct nuclear research and build up
enormous nuclear arsenals. Some of these nations even proliferated
nuclear technologies to others. Further, India and Pakistan have
always made it clear that they were attempting to develop nuclear
weapons. India even went so far as to test its own nuclear weapons in
1974. This international double-standard, coupled with the argument
of the persistent objector, states a strong case against the prohibition
on nuclear development becoming customary international law.
In addition to its efforts to halt nuclear development, the
international community has attempted to end nuclear testing.
Initially, it banned all nuclear tests above the ground. The
international community complied with that prohibition completely.
Most recently, the international community has attempted to ban all
forms of nuclear tests through the CTBT.
India and Pakistan signed the LTBT. They tested nuclear
weapons underground. This behavior complies with the prohibition
contained in the LTBT. They have not previously objected to the
total ban on nuclear testing. India's recent nuclear tests occurred
only once and long after the CTBT was signed. The sheer number of
nations combined under the CTBT elevated the prohibition on
nuclear testing and development into custom.
3. Customary International Environmental Law
The detrimental environmental effects of nuclear testing violates
existing and forming rules of international environmental law.' The
indiscriminate and uncontrollable nature of radioactive fallout
203. See CTBT, supra note 92, at annex 2.
204. See id., art. I.
205. See Steinfeld, supra note 133, at 1649.
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violates customary international environmental law as it relates to the
obligations of the state." Such a widespread threat to human health
and natural resources violates firmly entrenched customs that
specifically prohibit environmental damage and impact principles of
territorial integrity and discrimination.' Also, the ICJ has recently
recognized many newly forming principles of international
environmental law as attaining the status of custom.' Nuclear testing
violates these newer principles as well.
There are four ways nuclear testing violates customary
international environmental law. The testing of nuclear weapons
violates the concept of transboundary harm, the precautionary
principle, the principle of intergenerational equity and violates
principles of customary international environmental law that are
regarded as jus cogens.
a. The Concept of Transboundary Harm
There is a newly introduced norm of customary international law
not to cause transboundary harm.'M Recently, the ICJ was asked to
draft a general advisory opinion on the use of nuclear weapons!"
Article 29 of the majority opinion found that the concept of
transboundary harm has ascended to become "part of the corpus of
international law relating to the environment. 211 This norm was first
enumerated in the Trail Smelter Arbitration."
In Trail Smelter, a special arbitral tribunal determined that
Canada was liable for damage to U.S. crops caused through sulfur
dioxide fume emissions originating in Canada.! The tribunal decided
that, under international law, no nation is allowed to use or permit
the use of its territory to cause injury to another nation's territory or
people therein. 4 Trail Smelter is not binding precedent and its
decision was limited to the U.S. and Canada."5 However, it greatly
206. See id. at 1651.
207. See id.
208. See Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 71, at 821.
209. See Heverin, supra note 139, at 1296.
210. See generally Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 71, at 809.
211. Id. at 821.
212. See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941), reprinted
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influenced the UN Conference on the Human Environment at
Stockholm.216
The Stockholm Convention used the Trail Smelter decision to
illustrate the international norm to avoid transboundary harm.
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration states:
[Nations] have, in accordance with the Charter of the [UN] and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their own
jurisdiction and control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 8
Stockholm 21 is usually applied to peacetime, transboundary
pollution .2 9 The content of Stockholm 21 has been recognized in
treaties such as the Law of the Sea Convention, the ASEAN
Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources,
and the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution.220 The principle of transboundary harm was also recently
adopted in the Rio Declaration."2
Nuclear weapons are capable of damaging the environment in
unprecedentedly enormous ways. Nuclear weapons can destroy the
entire eco-system of the Earth. There are already enough nuclear
weapons to destroy the world many times over.'
The fallout from even one above-ground, nuclear detonation
cannot be confined within national boundaries.' WHO studies
indicate that the fall-out would extend for hundreds of miles
downwind.' The gamma-rays emitted from the explosion could
reach across national boundaries through radioactivity deposited in
the ground, inhalation from the air, consumption of contaminated
food, and from consumption of suspended radioactivity.'
All nations are in agreement that extremely elaborate
protections are necessary to prevent underground nuclear explosions
216. See Stockholm, supra note 111, at 1416.
217. See id.
218. Id. at principle 21.
219. See Heverin, supra note 139, at 1297-98.
220. See id.
221. See Rio, supra note 111, at 876.
222. See Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 71, at 891.
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from contaminating the environment.226 Even now, nuclear powers
accept that underground nuclear explosions are so deleterious to
health and the environment that they should be banned.
For example, the geological structure of an aquifer can be
impaired by underground nuclear testing and its contents irradiated.'
Many aquifers span the distance between national boundaries and
their contents can be shared by many countries.22 Water in liquid
state is mainly groundwater, representing 22.4 percent of all fresh
water. ' 9 The effects of underground nuclear tests are far-reaching
and unpredictable. Contamination of groundwater within an aquifer
can spread through many different countries and even go unnoticed
for many years.' ° Underground nuclear explosions are capable of
silently poisoning entire populations of other nations.
The environment, the common habitat of all member states of
the UN, cannot be damaged by one or more members to the
detriment of all others.21 The principles of environmental protection
have become so deeply rooted in the conscience of mankind that they
have become particularly essential rules of international law. The
testing of nuclear weapons violates these principles and is
unacceptable.
b. The Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle provides that "where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage (to the environment), lack of
full scientific certainty (about whether damage will be caused) should
not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent
environmental degradation. '"m This principle has been expressed in
seven international treaties and it has gained broad acceptance on the
international level.2 3
A corollary to the to the precautionary principle is the
requirement to make an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
226. See id.
227. See Julio Barberis, The Development of International Law of Transboundary
Groundwater, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 167, 170 (1991).
228. See id.
229. See id. at 167.
230. See Cf. id. at 168.
231. See Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 71, at 905.
232. Stephen M. Tokarz, A Golden Opportunity Dismissed: The New Zealand V.
France Nuclear Tests Case, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745,753 (1998).
233. See id.
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before a nation is able to undertake an action that is likely to
significantly effect the environment." The Noumea Convention
incorporates this mechanism by containing an explicit obligation to
conduct an EIA before beginning any project which might effect the
marine environment.s
Underground nuclear testing is always subject to the possibility
of harmful radiation escaping into the environment.' There is no
possible way to insure that the radiation will remain trapped
underground for the duration of the test, much less for the time it will
take for the radioactive remnants to become inert. A significant
amount of radioactive material will persist for thousands of years
before it begins to noticeably decay 37 There is no known process to
reverse the effects of a nuclear explosion. By its very nature, nuclear
testing is at odds with the prescriptions of customary international
environmental law and cannot satisfy its demands. For this reason,
nuclear testing violates international law and should be prohibited.
c. The Principle of Intergenerational Equity
Intergenerational equity is a concept of customary international
environmental law that places a responsibility on nations to "protect
and improve the environment for present and future generations. ''
Although a nation has sovereignty over its own territory,
intergenerational equity limits this sovereignty to uses of territorial
resources that do not destroy resources for future generations. 39 To
satisfy this principle, a nation must be able to prevent or repair
environmental damage caused by its use of the environment.2'°
Otherwise, the nation is automatically prohibited from engaging in
that particular use of the environment.24'
The principle of intergenerational equity has woven itself into
customary international environmental law through major treaties,
judicial opinions, and general principles of law recognized by civilized
234. Nuclear Test Case, supra note 181, at 343.
235. Noumea Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and
Environment in the South Pacific Region, Nov. 25,1986,26 I.L.M. 38 (1987).
236. See WHO Report, supra note 72.
237. See id.
238. Nuclear Test Case, supra 181, at 342 (quoting the Stockholm Declaration on
the Human Environment, principle 1).
239. See Tokarz, supra note 232, at 752.
240. See id. at 753.
241. See id.
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nations. The 1979 London Ocean Dumping Convention, the 1973
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, and the
1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the world Cultural
and Natural Heritage are all treaties that mention intergenerational
equity.242 There are several major scholarly works of great renown
that examine the concept of intergenerational equity. 3 There are a
multiplicity of traditional legal systems across the globe that
recognize this principle.24  There have been a series of major
international declarations commencing with the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment.2 '5 Finally, the UN Charter
specifically states that it is dedicated to social progress and better
standards of life for "succeeding generations."2"
The effects of underground nuclear testing extend beyond the
limits of all foreseeable historical time.247 One by-product of nuclear
testing, plutonium 239, has a half-life over 20,000 years.2" This means
that the environmentally hazardous, residual radiation generated by
nuclear testing will remain embedded in the Earth for hundreds of
thousands of years. Over this period of time, there is no doubt that
natural changes in the Earth's geology will allow the trapped
radiation to escape and interact with ground water or the atmosphere.
The effects on the world's eco-system could be catastrophic. No one
generation is allowed under the law to inflict such damage on future
generations."
d. Environmental Law as Jus Cogens
Jus cogens refers to general principles of international law that
are so fundamental they cannot be disobeyed.50 Jus cogens receives
its strongest support from the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.5' Article 53 states that "a treaty is void if, at the time of its
242. See Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 71, at 888.
243. See it.
244. See id.
245. See Rio, supra note 111, at principle 3; Stockholm, supra note 111, at principle
1.
246. U.N. Charter, supra note 170, at preamble.
247. See Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 71, at 890.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 888.
250. See Steinfeld, supra note 133, at 1648.
251. See id.
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conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory nom of international law."' 2
A peremptory norm is defined as "a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted." 3 This definition of peremptory
norm is equivalent to the concept of jus cogens5' General principles
that are considered jus cogens are absolutely binding. 5 There is no
mechanism to escape their legal power.
Jus cogens is based in the essential rules necessary to maintain
human society5 6  For example, principles defending peace and
security, principles against the use of force and principles prohibiting
crimes against humanity are all fundamental norms in international
law.' The concept of universal norms is expanding to address issues
that threaten the global environment 5 8  Threats such as ozone
depletion and ocean pollution endanger the global environment and
world population, demanding a set of laws that establish global
controls.59
While customary international environmental law is not
traditionally viewed as jus cogens, significant evidence exists that
there is a growing belief in environmental protection as a human right
crucial enough to give rise to its own custom. This belief is contained
in many recent UN resolutions, international conventions and
treaties.2w
e. Conclusion
Many principles of customary international environmental law
can be seen as prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons. However,
none have been particularly directed towards nuclear weapons and
the ICJ has not officially decided whether these mechanisms extend
to prohibit nuclear testing. The ICJ was provided with the
opportunity to examine this question in the French nuclear test case
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consider the merits of the argument.6'
The concept of the protection of the environment is definitely
fundamental to the continued existence of humanity. It is such an
important concept that many newly arising environmental concepts
are rapidly being incorporated into the corpus of international
custom. These principles are jus cogens. Nuclear testing violates
many of these principles and directly contradicts international law.
VI. Conclusion
Nuclear testing and the development of nuclear weapons have
cataclysmic effects on the world's political structure and environment.
Further nuclear testing and development should be averted at all
costs. Although alone, nuclear and environmental treaties currently
in force do not prohibit non-parties from testing and developing
nuclear weapons. Considered as a whole, these treaties have created
a new international custom against nuclear testing.
The international community has made many efforts over the
course of the years to limit nuclear development. However, due to
the efforts of many nations to develop and proliferate nuclear
technology, there are strong arguments against the creation of a
custom prohibiting nuclear development. Obviously, countries that
proliferated nuclear technology did not believe that treaties
prohibiting nuclear development were binding. Acts of proliferation
contrary to treaty provisions undermine the idea that nuclear treaties
created a customary prohibition against nuclear development.
On the other hand, the international community has also made
many efforts to limit nuclear testing. Every nation that signed a
nuclear test ban treaty respected its provisions. The international
community believed prohibitions on nuclear testing to be binding.
Even when India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons, they tested
them underground and in compliance with their obligations under
international law. In that sense, neither country previously objected
to any aspect of international law governing nuclear testing. The
culmination of the international community's efforts to prohibit
nuclear testing occurred at the closing of the CTBT in 1996. At the
closing of the CTBT, more nations than ever before simultaneously
denounced nuclear weapons testing. A customary prohibition against
nuclear testing was created at this time. Pakistan never tested
261. See Nuclear Test Case, supra note 181, at 420.
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weapons before this date. India tested one nuclear device. Neither of
these acts can be considered to constitute "persistent behavior." As a
result, the exemption of the persistent objector is not available to
India and Pakistan. It is irrefutable that nuclear testing violates
traditional and newly arising international environmental customs.
The ICJ has yet to specifically hold that nuclear testing is prohibited.
The ICJ has held that transboundary harm, the precautionary
principle and the principle of intergenerational equity are custom.
The effects of nuclear testing clearly violate these customs. For this
reason, nuclear testing clearly violates international law.
The world is poised on the brink of an unprecedented nuclear
era. Many nations will be attaining nuclear technology in the near
future and many underground test explosions may occur. Great
damage to the environment could ensue unless the international
community takes action. There are many nations in the world that
are less politically stable than the current nuclear weapons nations
and future nuclear conflicts or dissemination of nuclear weapons to
radical political groups could result. In this destabilized world future,
one thing is certain, the time is ripe for nuclear testing and
development to be prohibited completely.
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